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Abstract
In 2005, the European Parliament rejected the directive ‘on the patentability of
computer-implemented inventions’, which had been drafted and supported by the
European Commission, the Council and well-organised industrial interests, with an
overwhelming majority. In this unusual case, a coalition of opponents of software
patents prevailed over a strong industry-led coalition. We develop an explanation
based on political discourse and show that two stable and distinct discourse coali-
tions can be identified and measured over time. The apparently weak coalition of
software patent opponents shows typical properties of a hegemonic discourse coali-
tion. It presents itself as being more coherent, employs a better-integrated set of
frames and dominates key economic arguments, while the proponents of software
patents are not as well-organised. This configuration of the discourse gave leeway
for an alternative course of political action by the European Parliament. We op-
erationalise the notion of discourse coalitions and related structural features of the
discourse by drawing on social network analysis. More specifically, we introduce
discourse network analysis as a new methodology for the study of policy debates.
The approach is capable of measuring empirical discourses both statically and in a
longitudinal way and is compatible with the policy network approach.
Keywords: Software Patents, Intellectual Property Rights, Political Discourse,
Policy Networks, Social Network Analysis
Between 1997 and 2005, the question of whether software patents should be allowed in
Europe became one of the most contentious issues in which the European Parliament
and the other European institutions have ever been involved. At the end of the political
process, the European Parliament rejected the directive ‘on the patentability of computer-
implemented inventions’ (Commission of the European Communities (COM) 2002), which
had been drafted and supported by the European Commission, the Council and well-
organised industrial interests, with an overwhelming majority. We offer an explanation
of this unusual case based on the notion of discourse networks. A presumably resource-
poor anti-software-patents (‘anti-SWP’) coalition, composed mainly of individuals, small
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and medium-sized companies (SMEs) and some social movement organisations (SMOs),
was able to prevail over a pro-software-patents (‘pro-SWP’) coalition composed mainly of
multinational software firms. In this article, we argue that an explanation for the success
of the anti-software-patents coalition should be sought in the realm of political discourse.
An important part of political mobilisation, conflict and decision is the various verbal
and symbolic interventions that precede and accompany them. The insight that discourse
matters in politics predates what has sometimes been called the ‘linguistic turn’ in the
social sciences or the ‘argumentative turn’ in political science. In line with argumentative
discourse analysis (Hajer 2002, 1993, 1995) and discursive institutionalism (Schmidt and
Radaelli 2004; Schmidt 2008), we posit that the political process can be interpreted as a
conflict over discursive hegemony between two discourse coalitions and that one coalition
was more successful than the other in attaining this goal before the decision was made.
The configuration of the discourse gave leeway for an alternative course of political action
by the European Parliament.
We will employ a new tool called discourse network analysis (Leifeld 2009, 2010a) in
order to measure the European discourse on software patents in a dynamic way. This
method draws on social network analysis and establishes the link between the actors
and the contents of a discourse at several critical steps. For any given policy debate, our
approach allows identification of a discrete spectrum of networks, which we call affiliation
networks, actor congruence networks, conflict networks, concept congruence networks and
dynamic discourse networks. Each of these items operationalises a certain aspect of a
policy debate.
1 Discourse coalitions in political conflicts
Schmidt and Radaelli argue that the discursive dimension is often neglected in expla-
nations of political processes and particularly in explanations of policy change (Schmidt
and Radaelli 2004; Schmidt 2008). Discourse ‘assists in the attempt to integrate struc-
ture and agency—and thus to explain the dynamics of change’ (Schmidt and Radaelli
2004: 192). Similarly, Emirbayer and Goodwin criticise network analysis for missing out
on the cultural embeddedness of historical networks, particularly in terms of political
discourse. Structure, agency and culture should be analysed jointly in order fully to
understand political phenomena (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994). The structure of the
discourse constrains the set of feasible actions by political actors and thus makes up a
‘fourth institutionalism’ (Schmidt 2008). For example, if public policy debates tend to
ignore a policy instrument, it is unlikely to be implemented; thus, discourses precondition
political action, much like other kinds of institutions. At the same time, agency is still
important because the skills of political actors in developing, establishing and referring
to the right ideas at the right time and thus influencing the evolution of the discourse
over time is critical (Schmidt 2008: 315).
1.1 The structure of political discourses
To determine the configuration of the discourse that conditioned the decision of the
European Parliament in 2005, the literature on discourse coalitions and framing offers
promising starting points. Hajer’s argumentative discourse analysis suggests that the dis-
cursive space is composed of several discourse coalitions whose members centre around
common story lines (Hajer 2002: 12). A discourse coalition is a ‘group of actors who
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share a social construct’ (Hajer 1993: 45) and who try to influence policy processes by
imposing their perspective on others. Social constructs give meaning to the social en-
vironment. They are shared interpretations through which the world is perceived and
which structure individual and collective action. In the tradition of symbolic interaction-
ism, the discursive construction of shared interpretations is called ‘framing’. A frame
simplifies and condenses ‘the “world out there” by selectively punctuating and encoding
objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present
or past environment’ (Snow and Benford 1992: 137). This process of constructing or
framing political problems is a highly significant element of the political process. In a
political conflict, frames define the problem, offer solutions, and describe ways to arrive
at this solution, that is, they function as diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames
(Benford and Snow 2000). Successful frames or ‘frame bundles’ (Haunss and Kohlmorgen
2009) in a political mobilisation will often combine these three elements and integrate
them into consistent narratives or story lines (Hajer 1993; Polletta 1998).1
In order to influence policy processes, discourse coalitions have to be relatively stable
with regard to their core (most central) frames and actors. Their members must show
strong ideational congruence within the coalition and aim at showing only a low degree
of ideational overlap with opposing coalitions. Each coalition should therefore show an
idiosyncratic framing pattern with a high level of agreement within a coalition and a high
level of conflict between coalitions.
1.2 The success of a discourse coalition
Hajer argues that, in order to be successful, a discourse coalition has to dominate the
discursive space, and the institutional practices in the political domain have to reflect this
discursive dominance (Hajer 1993: 48). The frame bundle of a successful coalition will
therefore contain and dominate the core frames of the conflict. The dominant coalition
will appear more prominently in the news media, gain a larger constituency, and it will
be able to integrate the core frames into a more consistent story-line than its opponents.
The discourse around a political conflict is constantly in flux. Discourse coalitions
therefore permanently have to realign and regroup some of their frames. These frame
alignment processes (Snow et al. 1986) can only succeed if the members of a discourse
coalition maintain a high level of congruence, which crucially depends on the coherence
of its members in terms of common arguments. In other words, the sharing of com-
mon arguments is more helpful than a situation in which diverse arguments are widely
dispersed among the members of a coalition and when pairs of actors rarely agree on
the same arguments. In social-network terms, the dominant discourse coalition should
exhibit more clustering and a higher density on the ideational congruence relation.
In addition to congruence at the actor level, the discursive politics literature with
its emphasis on narrative fidelity and story lines suggests that frames should also be
well integrated in order to facilitate policy success (Hajer 1993; Polletta 1998; Fisher
1984). Snow and Benford assume that, in order to be successful, mobilisations should
1In the remainder of this article, we will use the terms ‘social construct’ (Hajer 1993), ‘concept’
(Roth and Bourgine 2005), ‘category’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) and ‘idea’ (Braun and Busch 1999)
to denote a single, abstract ideational item, for example an interpretation, a solution concept or an
attribution of causality. ‘Claims’ (Koopmans and Statham 1999) or ‘statements’ (Carley and Palmquist
1992) are concrete instances of these concepts, issued by a specific actor at a specific date in a certain
way. The terms ‘frame’ (Benford and Snow 2000), ‘story-line’ (Hajer 2002) and ‘frame bundle’ (Haunss
and Kohlmorgen 2009) denote the aggregate collection of concepts employed by a certain group of actors.
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Construct Operationalisation
Stability of coalitions over time Time slices of an actor congruence network
Ideational congruence within Actor congruence network; weighted density;
coalitions global clustering coefficient
Competition between discourse Conflict network; weighted within- and
coalitions between-block density
Large constituency Number of vertices per coalition in the actor
congruence network
Domination of the core frames Affiliation network and concept congruence
network; degree centrality and positive or
negative tendency
Integration of frames in a coherent Concept congruence network; average
storyline weighted degree/weighted density
Broadness and diversity of a frame Concept congruence network; number of
bundle concepts per discourse coalition, qualitative
diversity of concepts per cluster
Table 1: Operationalisation of theoretical constructs
not rely on too narrow a set of frames, while at the same time they should avoid ‘frame
overextension’ that adds too many different aspects that lead to a disintegration of the
frame set (Snow and Benford 1988: 206; but see Kliment 1998 for a critical position). A
successful coalition should therefore manage to bundle a variety of different arguments
in a broad, but still integrated, set of frames, while unsuccessful discourse coalitions are
more likely to reiterate the same limited set of arguments over and over again.
In sum, the literature on discourse coalitions and framing suggests several indicators
for the success of discourse coalitions vis-a`-vis other discourse coalitions when influencing
policy making (for their operationalisation, see Table 1):
• Successful coalitions are stable over time with regard to their core frames and actors.
• Internally, their members show strong ideational congruence.
• Externally, they stand united against competing coalitions.
• Successful coalitions attract a large constituency.
• Successful discourse coalitions dominate the core frames of a conflict.
• They are able to integrate the frames they employ into a consistent story-line.
• Their frame bundle is sufficiently broad, but not too diverse.
Starting from these general considerations, we argue in this article that the structure
of the policy discourse on software patents facilitated a departure from the historical
pathway initiated by the European Commission in 1997 with its Green Paper ‘Promoting
innovation through patents’ (Commission of the European Communities (COM) 1997).
More specifically, an anti-SWP coalition was able to dominate the policy discourse, which
led to an adoption of its interpretation by the European Parliament as the decisive institu-
tion. At the same time, the pro-SWP coalition was not able to monopolise key economic
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arguments. By arguing that the structure of the political discourse was conducive to
the rejection of the software patent initiative by the European Parliament, we provide a
discursive-institutionalist explanation of the political outcome in the European conflict
over software patents.
Discursive hegemony is never the only factor that will explain policy outcomes. En-
trenched power structures and interest coalitions do not lose their importance by adding
a discursive layer. But the more public and the more politicised a decision-making pro-
cess is, the less can the discursive level be ignored. If a parliament with more than 700
members and weak party discipline decides in a highly politicised situation, the attrac-
tive power of ideas is of crucial importance. A discursive explanation of the outcome of
the European conflict over software patents can thus aid structure- or resource-oriented
explanations (for example, Haunss and Kohlmorgen 2010).2
2 A short history of the software patents conflict
As outlined in the introduction, the software patents conflict between 1997 and 2005
has been one of the most contentious issues in European Union politics. At the begin-
ning of the discourse in June 1997, when the European Commission published its Green
Paper with the title ‘Promoting innovation through patents’ (Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities (COM) 1997), nobody would have foreseen the contentious trajectory
of this conflict. In contrast, it was generally assumed that this arcane issue would be
resolved by the specialists and experts of the patent community with minimal interfer-
ence. In retrospect, the software patents conflict in Europe was clearly an example of
increasingly politicised disputes about intellectual property rights worldwide (Haunss and
Shadlen 2009). The issue soon started to attract the attention of many small software
programmers and the free and open source community at large. The internet consultation
launched by the Commission received 1,450 responses within two months, 91 percent of
the responses rejecting the proposed patentability of software. Thousands of individu-
als, organisations and firms signed the ‘EuroLinux Petition’ calling for a prohibition of
software patents in Europe, and in February 1999, FFII, the Federation for a Free In-
formation Infrastructure, was founded to mobilise against the proposed directive. They
stood against resourceful and powerful European business associations ranging from the
general European industry association UNICE (now Business Europe) to technology as-
sociations like the Business Software Association (BSA) and the European Information,
Communications and Consumer Electronics Industry Technology Association (EICTA).
After the Commission had ignored all the critical submissions in its 2002 proposal for
a directive ‘on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions’ (Commission of the
European Communities (COM) 2002), a turbulent decision-making process followed. In
the first reading, the European Parliament followed in its majority the software patent
opponents’ arguments and de facto reversed the directive’s intentions with a series of
amendments, which the Commission and the Council almost completely removed in the
2This explanation cannot fully account for the reasons why specific actors joined or left the discourse
coalitions at a specific point in time because this dynamic is influenced by mechanisms outside the
discursive level. Information about actual cooperation and resource exchange relationships would be
needed to explain the network development, which is beyond the scope of this study (but see Haunss
and Kohlmorgen 2010 for a network analysis of the cooperation relation between the actors involved in
the conflict).
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so-called ‘common position’ in 2005. In the second reading in the EP, the directive was
finally rejected with a huge majority of 648 to 14 votes (Eimer 2008).
During this conflict, an increasing level of public attention was paid to the issue.
Whereas software patents were a topic for a very specialised audience of patent profes-
sionals in 1997, eight years later the issue was present in the politics, economics and
technology pages of regular daily newspapers.
Media discourse in the software patents conflict occurred in three waves following the
institutional decision-making process. Relatively low-profile press coverage accompanied
the consultation phase and the publication of the proposal for the directive (wave 1).
More intense media attention followed the parliament’s first and second reading (wave 2
and wave 3, respectively). In line with these institutionally structured media attention
cycles, the group of actors whose statements appear most often in the press are the
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). They account for 18.8 per cent of the
statements in our data set, followed by civil society organisations, small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs), large corporations, and business associations, each responsible
for between 12 and 10 per cent of the claims.
3 Data
Our analysis draws on data collected in a research project on European intellectual prop-
erty conflicts (Haunss and Kohlmorgen 2009), specifically on 124 newspaper articles about
software patents from four key countries (Germany, UK, France and Poland) published
between 1997 and 2005. The article selection was designed to capture all claims that
have been reported in quality newspapers in the four countries that were most important
in this conflict. The claims were manually coded using predefined codes from a codebook
(Haunss and Kohlmorgen 2008) based on the coding scheme developed in the Europub
project (Koopmans 2002). The coding scheme was adapted and expanded after initial
coding of a subset of the articles. The software Discourse Network Analyzer (Leifeld
2010a) was used to assign actor and category tags to the text data and extract social
networks from these structured data.
For the discourse network analysis, only those claims were considered where an inter-
pretation of the claim was reported in the article. A report that only mentions the date
of a demonstration and the number of participants, for example, contains a claim but no
frame, as it does not tell anything about the motives of the demonstrators apart from
their aim. If, however, an article contains the information that an FFII spokesperson
stated during an FFII-led conference that software patents would be bad for small IT
companies, this is encoded as a claim because it is a public statement containing a frame:
‘Software patents are bad because they negatively affect the competitiveness of small
and medium-sized enterprises’. In this context, frames are the reasons that are given
for a specific instance of claims-making. They are sometimes explicit and often implicit
arguments or concepts used by the actors. A claim can be any intervention in a political
conflict (a statement, a petition, a demonstration, a resolution, etc.). In the software
patents conflict, 82 percent of the reported claims were verbal statements.
Coding only claims that have been reported in newspapers limits the analysis to a
subset of the total claims made in the conflict since not all claims are reported. There may
thus be a selection bias towards certain actors and action forms. However, we assume that
unreported claims are less important than reported claims because they remain invisible
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to most of the decision makers as well (for a more detailed discussion, see Earl et al.
2004).
The coded articles contain 355 substantial claims where an interpretation, reason or
argument was given why this claim was made. If the claim was made in support of the
software patents directive, it was coded as being a positive statement; if it was made
against the directive, it was coded as a negative statement. Seventeen statements were
ambiguous or neutral, but since they account for less than five per cent of all claims
and since it was often not clear whether their ambiguity was the result of the reporting
or the claimant’s intention, they were omitted from the analysis, leaving us with 338
valued claims. The categorisation works in a similar way as category-based, computer-
assisted, qualitative data analysis, but the coder additionally specifies the actor to whom
the statement can be attributed.
For the discourse network analysis, we thus compiled a list of the claims containing
information about the actor, the concept (frame) the actor referred to, a dummy variable
indicating whether the concept was used in a positive or negative way (for or against
software patents), and the date of the claim.
4 Method
We employ a new tool called discourse network analysis (Leifeld 2010a, 2009) in order
to measure and visualise the political discourse on software patents. Discourse network
analysis is a combination of category-based content analysis of newspaper data and social
network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 1994). Hence, it is more formal than most other
approaches dealing with policy discourse. For any given policy debate, a set of five basic
types of discourse networks can be generated: affiliation networks, actor congruence net-
works, conflict networks, concept congruence networks and dynamic discourse networks.
Operationalising policy debates by employing social network analysis is a natural choice,
as discourse, especially the alignment of actors by common claims, is essentially a rela-
tional phenomenon, and social network analysis can be conceived of as a ‘methodological
toolbox’ for relational analysis (Kenis and Schneider 1991).
The method is related to political claims analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999) be-
cause it focuses on the same unit of analysis: the statement (or the claim, in the language
of political claims analysis). Both approaches incorporate actors and the concepts they
employ, which goes well beyond some other empirical approaches to political discourse;
as Steensland observes, ‘few existing studies link frames with the actors who sponsor
them, thus presenting an oddly disembodied picture of framing processes’ (Steensland
2008: 1031).
In addition, discourses or the co-evolution of actors and ideas, are rarely analysed
systematically in a longitudinal way (Hall 1993). Discourse network analysis is well
equipped to analyse discourse in a dynamic perspective.
A third advantage of discourse network analysis over competing approaches to the
empirical analysis of political discourse is that it allows us to disentangle complex discur-
sive structures in a bottom-up approach. Discourse coalitions are sometimes identified
post-facto by drawing on expert interviews. The result is often a bipolar discourse with
two distinct, non-overlapping and internally homogeneous coalitions. Discourse network
analysis, in contrast, allows us to identify sub-coalitions within a discourse coalition, or to
assess the multiple cleavage lines that are actually present in the discourse, rather than
7
merely to classify actors into coalition A or B. The approach reduces complexity to a
degree that is understandable while at the same time maintaining enough complexity to
avoid oversimplification. Thus, we can relax the exogenous assumption of homogeneous
discourse coalitions and measure the actual empirical structure of the discourse instead.
The basic form of a discourse network is the affiliation network. From affiliation
networks, we can construct actor congruence networks, conflict networks, and concept
congruence networks as well as dynamic versions of these network types. To begin with,
there is a set of actors, A = {a1, a2 · · · am}, and a set of concepts, C = {c1, c2 · · · cn}. An
actor can either agree or disagree with a concept. Thus, there are two binary relations be-
tween actors and concepts, one for agreement and one for disagreement: R = {r1, r2 · · · rl}
with l = 2.3 There is also a set of discrete time points T = {t1, t2 · · · tk} because the
discourse network can be repeatedly observed.
The most basic form is a bipartite graph of actors referring to concepts either in
a positive or in a negative way at a certain time point. The bipartite graph is called
affiliation network:
Gaffr,t = (A,C,E
aff
r,t ) with {a, a′} /∈ Eaffr,t ∧ {c, c′} /∈ Eaffr,t (1)
In this equation, a′ denotes an actor who is not identical with actor a, and c′ denotes
a concept that is not identical with concept c. Eaffr,t refers to the set of edges in the
affiliation graph Gaff at time t and for relation r. Alternatively, an affiliation network can
be expressed as a rectangular m×n matrix Xr,t for each relation and time period with row
actors referring to column concepts. For practical purposes, both relations—agreement
and disagreement—can be collapsed into a single, multiplex network with different kinds
of edges representing the relations.
Applied to the empirical data, an actor is connected to a concept in the affiliation
network if (s)he makes a claim in which (s)he uses this concept. Figure 1 provides an
illustration of an affiliation network. It can simultaneously show actors and concepts as
well as their interrelations, which goes beyond most existing measurement approaches to
political discourse. Moreover, the data can be subdivided into several time slices in order
to obtain repeated measurements of the discourse.
The measurement of empirical discourse coalitions requires another abstraction from
the structured text data. The affiliation network can be converted into an actor congru-
ence network by interpreting the number of common statements between two actors as a
measure of their discursive similarity. The basic idea is that the more concepts two actors
agree (or both disagree) on, the more similar they are in terms of common arguments
in the discourse, and the more likely they will belong to the same discourse coalition.
Thus, it is straightforward to move from a bipartite affiliation graph to a co-occurrence
graph where actors are connected to other actors and where the edge weight between
these actors represents the number of common statements. The overall topology of the
resulting congruence network can be used as a map of the discourse where clusters of
actors represent discourse coalitions.
This can be achieved by multiplying the affiliation matrix by its transpose.
Yar,t := Xr,tX
>
r,t (2)
3In the software patents conflict, negative statements nicely correspond to the anti-SWP coalition and
positive statements to the pro-SWP coalition. As shown below, however, using positive and negative
statements will yield cleavage lines of higher dimensionality in many other case studies.
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Equivalently, an edge in the graph can be defined in terms of the intersection of
the adjacent concept vertices (‘neighbors’) of two actor nodes in the bipartite affiliation
graph. Let NGaffr,t(a) be the set of neighbors of vertex a, that is, the set of concepts the
actor refers to. Then the following equation makes up an actor congruence network with
vertex set A and the set of edge weights Wt:
Gat = (A,W
a
t ) with wt(a, a
′) =
l∑
r=1
|NGaffr,t(a) ∩NGaffr,t(a′)| (3)
As is the case with actors, we can also construct a concept congruence network based
on the affiliations. In this co-occurrence network, two concepts are connected if they are
used by the same actor in the same way, and the edge weight between two concepts equals
the number of actors referring to both concepts:
Ycr,t := X
>
r,tXr,t (4)
and
Gct = (C,W
c
t ) with wt(c, c
′) =
l∑
r=1
|NGaffr,t(c) ∩NGaffr,t(c′)| (5)
This yields a map of the concepts in a discourse. Clusters of concepts can be inter-
preted as coherent story lines.
So far, co-occurrence networks of actors or concepts have been representations of simi-
larity between actors or between concepts. However, there is another piece of information
hidden in the original data: conflictual relations, or dissimilarity between vertices. For
example, one actor makes a claim in a positive way while another actor makes the same
claim in a negative way—in other words, one actor rejects the claim of the other actor.
We expect conflict ties to be prevalent between the clusters of a congruence network,
but not within clusters, as suggested by argumentative discourse analysis (Hajer 1993:
45). The notion of a conflict network is related to an actor congruence network, but the
definition of an edge weight is different:
Gconflt =(A,W
confl
t )
with wt(a, a
′) = |NGaffr=1,t(a) ∩NGaffr=2,t(a′)|+ |NGaffr=2,t(a) ∩NGaffr=1,t(a′)|
(6)
or
Yconflt := Xr=1,tX
>
r=2,t + Xr=2,tX
>
r=1,t (7)
Political discourse is essentially a dynamic rather than a stable phenomenon. Dis-
cursive interactions are conditional on past interactions. One way to measure change
over time is to subdivide the whole discourse into several time slices. We will do this in
the analysis of the three waves of the software patent conflict. Beyond simply compar-
ing static pictures, it is possible to use dynamic network visualisation tools in order to
visualise the changing roles of actors between the time slices in an animation.
Employing time slices basically divides time into discrete segments, although time
is actually continuous. However, by using discrete time steps, one may lose some in-
formation. Generating a continuous-time animation would be desirable. The Discourse
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c1
c2 c3
a1
a2
a3
a4
Illustration of the affiliation network
actor
concept
agreement (pro-SWP)
disagreement (anti-SWP)
concepts anti-SWP indegree pro-SWP indegree
actors anti-SWP outdegree pro-SWP outdegree
41 14Competitiveness of SMEs
29 18Innovation and transfer of knowledge
13 14Economic growth & stability
7 17Competitiveness of the European economy
23 1Monopolies
20 2Democratic procedures
7 14Research and development
7 7National economy
14 0Open access/open source
2 10Harmonization
4 6Rule of law
25 0FFII
17 0ISOC
16 0Michel Rocard (PSE)
0 15EICTA
0 15European Commission
15 0FSF
0 8Siemens
0 7Microsoft
Figure 1: Affiliation network, 1997–2005. Note: The size of the bars is proportional to
the concept’s indegree or actor’s outdegree centrality. Degree centrality corresponds to
the number of negative statements (left of the middle line) plus the number of positive
claims (right of the middle).
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Network Analyzer software offers several more nuanced ways to create dynamic discourse
networks or to aggregate dynamic data into static representations. The description of
these longitudinal algorithms, however, is beyond the scope of this article (see Leifeld
2010b: for details).
5 The discourse networks of the software patents
conflict
As noted above, the aggregate affiliation network of the software patents conflict between
1997 and 2005 is fairly complex. Therefore, Figure 1 shows an illustration of the affiliation
network plus the indegree centrality4 of the most prominent concepts (represented by the
size of the bars), the outdegree centrality of the most active actors, and the empirical
tendency of these concepts and actors toward the anti-SWP or pro-SWP camp.
The core frames used by the actors were competitiveness of SMEs (SME; indegree:
55), innovation and transfer of knowledge (ToK; indegree: 47), economic growth/stability
(G&S; indegree: 27), competitiveness of the European economy (CEE; indegree: 24), mo-
nopolies (MON; indegree: 24), democratic procedures (DEM; indegree: 22), and research
and development (R&D; indegree: 21).5 The five most central of these frames were highly
disputed. The SME and ToK frames were clearly dominated by the opponents with a ra-
tio of 14:41 and 18:29, the G&S frame was equally used by both sides (14:13), the frames
CEE and R&D were dominated by the pro software patents coalition (17:7, 14:7), and the
MON and DEM frames were owned almost exclusively by the opponents (1:23, 2:20).The
most visible actors were the Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure (FFII; out-
degree: 25), the Polish Internet Society (ISOC; outdegree: 17), the French MEP Michel
Rocard (outdegree: 16), the European Information & Communications Technology In-
dustry Association (EICTA; outdegree: 15), the European Commission (outdegree: 15),
and the Free Software Foundation (FSF; outdegree: 14).
Figure 2 shows the actor congruence network Ga for the whole time period 1997–
2005. Bridges (Wasserman and Faust 1994: 114 ff.) and important actors are labelled,
and line width reflects the edge weight, which measures the number of concepts two
actors share. Two distinct discourse coalitions with very few overlapping statements
are clearly visible. This strong polarisation, which is not generally found in all policy
conflicts, can be interpreted as a first indicator of the politicisation and significance of the
conflict. The anti-SWP discourse coalition on the left is composed of dedicated initiatives
against software patents (for example, FFII, stop-swpat.de, or NoSoftwarePatents.com),
NGOs (like CPTech or Attac), free/open source software (F/OSS) organisations like the
FSF, Linux Verband (LiVe) and ISOC, and a substantial number of MEPs from all major
groups in the European Parliament. The pro-SWP discourse coalition is mainly composed
of hardware and software firms like Siemens, Nokia, Microsoft, Alcatel, Philips, and SAP,
their European and national industry associations (EICTA, BSA, ZVEI), a number of
MEPs and patent lawyers who might profit from the introduction of software patents
(for example, the Computer Law Association), with EICTA being the most central and
most active political actor. The European Parliament and the German government act
as bridges. However, this is due to inexact reporting where claims were attributed to
4Indegree refers to the number of (incoming) citations of a concept. Outdegree is the number of
(outgoing) citations by an actor (Wasserman and Faust 1994).
5For a complete list of coded frames, see the appendix.
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Figure 3: The actor congruence network subdivided into three time slices. Note: White
nodes are organisations or private individuals, grey nodes represent Members of the Eu-
ropean Parliament.
‘the government’ or ‘the parliament’. If these claims could be disaggregated to specific
MEPs or government agencies, their bridging role would most likely disappear, leaving
two completely separate discourse coalitions.
How have these coalitions developed over time? In Figure 3, we have subdivided the
data into three time slices according to the three media attention cycles and created the
actor congruence network for each time slice. Several interesting things can be observed.
The overlap between the two discourse coalitions disappears, and the congruence network
is composed of two distinct components during each of the three time periods (if isolates
are not counted as components). The apparent broker role of the German government
and the EP thus disappears if we control for time. There are indeed two distinct and
stable discourse coalitions as predicted by argumentative discourse analysis. Members
of the European Parliament only start to join the media discourse during the second
wave, which seems plausible because the second wave corresponds to the first reading in
the parliament. Moreover, software patents become more contested over time, with both
discourse coalitions becoming more active and growing in size, particularly in the third
and therefore critical period.
The overall structure of the discourse clearly shows two distinct and stable discourse
coalitions competing for dominance in the political arena. The network graphs demon-
strate that both coalitions are highly connected internally on the congruence relation, an
indicator of strong internal agreement.
We have already seen in Figure 1 that the core concepts were highly disputed, so the
conflict is characterised by strong topical overlap and frequent attacking and re-framing
between the coalitions. To measure systematically the degree of in-group agreement and
between-group conflict, we have classified all actors into one of the two discourse coalitions
based on their tie profiles and calculated the weighted density within and between the two
blocks (for the congruence relation and the conflict relation separately). Weighted density
is defined as the ratio of the sum of all edge weights to the maximum number of possible
ties. In the congruence relation, the density is 0.87 in the anti-SWP coalition, 0.84 in
the pro-SWP coalition and 0.01 between the two blocks, as expected. In the conflict
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Figure 4: m-core (with m = 5) of the multiplex concept congruence network of frames,
1999–2005. Note: Squares represent concepts, size and position correspond to degree
centrality, and line width reflects the number of actors sharing two concepts. Edge color
indicates whether concepts are shared by actors supporting (black) or opposing (grey) the
software patents directive. Abbreviated concept names are used for better readability.
relation, where a tie is established if one actor uses a concept in a positive way and the
other actor in a negative way, the within-block density is 0.00 in the anti-SWP coalition
and 0.02 in the pro-SWP coalition, and the between-block density is 0.67. This confirms
that re-framing was the dominant strategy in this conflict. The discourse coalitions could
have engaged in a competition by using distinct sets of frames, but this is apparently not
the case in this highly contested political process.
A more detailed analysis allows us to explain why the anti-SWP coalition was able to
prevail over the coalition supporting the directive. Figure 4 shows the concept congruence
network of the software patent conflict. To highlight the underlying structure more
clearly, we use the m-core with m = 5 of the concept congruence network. An m-core (or
m-slice) is a maximal subgraph containing the lines with a weight equal or greater than
m and the vertices incident with these lines. Grey edges represent co-usage of concepts
by oppositional actors, while black lines stand for co-usage of concepts in support of the
software patents directive. The line width represents the number of actors referring to
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Figure 5: Network statistics for the two coalitions of figure 3. Note: Grey squares indicate
the anti-SWP discourse coalition, and black circles the pro-SWP coalition.
both concepts in the same way, and the size and position of the nodes is a function of
their degree centrality (Freeman 1978).
Two important insights can be gained from Figure 4: first and most importantly,
both opponents and supporters of the directive referred to multiple core concepts of the
controversy in their statements, but the opponents did this in a more coherent manner,
dominating the core concept ‘innovation’, which they tightly bundled with arguments
about ‘competitiveness of SMEs’, ‘economic growth and stability’, ‘monopolies’, ‘demo-
cratic procedures’, and ‘research & development’. The frame bundle of the supporters
contained ‘competitiveness of SMEs’ only at its margin and was clearly centred around
‘innovation’, ‘competitiveness of the European economy’, ‘harmonisation’, and R&D,
which are less central on average than the anti-SWP concepts. The successful coalition
thus indeed dominated the core frames.
Second, the network analysis shows that the opponents of software patents were able
to bundle together a more diverse array of arguments, ranging from consumer rights over
questions of democracy, labour market and open access to economic arguments. The pro-
SWP coalition, on the other hand, was limited to economic and legal arguments. The fact
that the average degree (discarding edge weight) of the concepts used by the opponents is
still 5.3 at the 5-core level, in combination with the high density of the actor congruence
network, indicates that these concepts have been used by many actors concurrently, a
sign of a well-integrated discourse coalition. The average degree of the frames used
by the supporters of the directive was—despite the smaller number of concepts—lower
than that of the opponents (4.2). The successful coalition thus integrated a broad set
of frames without overextending them—many aspects were addressed, but this did not
lead to disintegration of the framing. Despite their number, the various frames were
still tightly held together in an integrated narrative that made innovation an issue of
supporting SMEs and tied their interest to the democratic legitimacy of the European
institutions.
To measure the visibility and cohesion of the coalitions in the discourse, Figure 5 plots
some relevant network statistics for the three time periods shown in Figure 3. The anti-
SWP coalition quantitatively dominated the discourse in all three phases of the conflict.
In the first two waves, the number of actors was about 20 in the anti-SWP discourse
coalition and about 10 in the pro-SWP coalition. In the third time slice, the anti-SWP
coalition had 36 active members and its counterpart 26. Even the newspaper data—
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rather fragmentary in this regard—thus reflects the stronger mobilisation capacity of the
anti-SWP coalition.
A similar dominance can be observed when considering the coherence of the coalitions.
We employ weighted density and the weighted global clustering coefficient as two measures
of coherence of the coalitions on the congruence relation. Density can be interpreted as
a measure of overall agreement between the actors in the network. Clustering is high if
there are many closed triplets (triads). Clustering and density are highest if everybody
agrees with everybody else. High density and clustering values indicate that a discourse
coalition is compact and conveys a coherent policy image.
High density and clustering values for the opponents of software patents over all time
periods show that they conveyed a higher congruence throughout the media discourse.
The pro-SWP coalition, on the other hand, failed to provide a coherent story line. In-
stead, its members used diverse concepts, and there was only limited agreement on these
concepts in the media. Only one actor, EICTA, had a central position in the third wave
and combined the arguments of all other actors. In contrast, the opponents of software
patents frequently shared the same arguments, and hence their coalition appeared more
compact. They were consequently able to convey a coherent policy image against software
patents.
Based on these indicators, we can conclude that the opponents of software patents were
able to acquire and maintain hegemony over the discourse throughout the conflict. As
Baumgartner and Jones point out, the group of policy actors that has the most coherent
policy image attracts a large constituency and is likely to win over competing groups of
actors in policy-making (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). Those who want to change the
status quo will collaboratively try to convey a coherent image of their desired policy to the
public in order to convince decision makers and their voters. In the sense of Baumgartner
and Jones, our analysis has provided clear evidence for the superiority of the anti-software-
patent policy image and its associated discourse coalition. The defeat of software patents
in Europe is therefore in line with the theoretical predictions, even though it may be
impossible to measure rigorously the extent to which an individual decision maker was
actually influenced by the discourse versus other factors. Experimental studies may shed
light on this final step in the causal chain. However, anecdotal evidence from newspaper
accounts and interviews with participants in the conflict supports our interpretation. In
the final stage of the decision-making process, the European Parliament was the decisive
actor. At this point, the conflict was already highly politicised, and Members of the
Parliament were no longer consistently following the recommendations of the rapporteurs
of their respective parties. Instead, cross-party coalitions emerged for and against the
directive. In this situation, it is straightforward to assume that the discursive hegemony
of the anti-SWP coalition was a key factor that led the majority of the Members of the
European Parliament to reject the directive in their final vote.
6 Discussion and conclusion
Our analysis has provided evidence for the existence of two competing discourse coali-
tions in the European conflict over software patents. We have been able to identify the
core framing strategies of the competing coalitions and to measure the structure of the
discourse both statically and in a dynamic way. Most importantly, we have provided
bottom-up empirical evidence for the hegemony of a discourse coalition composed of op-
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ponents of software patents. More specifically, the analysis in the preceding section has
produced the following interesting findings:
• The constellation shows all elements of a highly politicised conflict. The actors
are split into two very distinct discourse coalitions which do not share a single
conviction. However, topical overlap between the coalitions is large, and conflicts
between the coalitions (but not within coalitions) are prevalent.
• The bipolar structure is stable over time. In all three political waves, the opponents
of software patents are better organised, their arguments are more congruent, and
they have a larger constituency and are more visible in the media.
• At the level of the contents of the discourse, the anti-software-patent coalition domi-
nates the core frames and manages to bundle together various arguments coherently,
while both the heterogeneity and the integration of the pro-SWP story line are far
less pronounced.
These findings provide a discursive-institutionalist explanation of the policy outcome
in 2005 when the European Parliament rejected the directive proposed by the European
Commission in its 1997 Green Paper. The proponents of software patents failed to mo-
nopolise key economic arguments, gather a large constituency in the media, provide a
coherent policy image and present their arguments in a compact and congruent man-
ner. The discourse network analysis of the conflict confirms the notion that discourse
does matter and is able to offer a conclusive explanation why the opponents of software
patents won over the adherents of software patents.
Our analysis has focused on the policy debate rather than the resource endowment of
the actors—a variable often used in the interest group literature (Bennett 1999; Bouwen
2004; Burns 2004; Du¨r 2008; Grande 1996; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 2006; Eising 2004;
Kohler-Koch 1997). While it may seem at first glance that a resource-poor ‘grassroots’
coalition won over a resource-rich coalition of multinational corporations, however, we
cannot fully rule out that the distribution of resources is less clear than it may seem. We
do not suggest that resources are irrelevant in political conflicts. They certainly matter,
and in many cases command over resources will strongly influence or even decide the
outcome. But because political conflicts, by definition, occur at least partially in the
public domain, the discursive level will always play a role, too. Sometimes, financial
resources determine success in the discursive realm—and the e 4 million spent by the
software industry in the third phase of the conflict (Gehlen 2006) possibly saved them
from an amended directive that might have clearly forbidden software patents in Europe.
But more often, even if resources play a role, a careful analysis of the discursive level
will enhance resource-based analysis and can offer consistent explanations even where
the latter alone will fail.
The network analysis of political discourse is, furthermore, able to qualify and substan-
tiate several assumptions of the existing literature on framing and discourse coalitions. It
allows us to measure discursive dominance and gives us a tool to operationalise notions
of narrative fidelity, frame congruence, and the coherence of coalitions.
Our analysis has demonstrated the applicability and usefulness of discourse network
analysis for the empirical analysis of political discourse. This method is capable of produc-
ing insights that are unobservable when relying on conventional interpretive or aggregate
statistical approaches. Particularly, the discourse network framework allows one to:
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• measure discourse coalitions empirically instead of simply assuming that a certain
predefined number of coalitions exists;
• measure discourses in a multidimensional way and discover cleavage lines or sub-
groups even within discourse coalitions, rather than imposing a one-dimensional,
reductionist constraint on the data;
• track the evolution of a discourse over time (either on the basis of discrete time
slices or as a continuous-time animation); and
• observe the overall topography of the discourse on the actor level, concept level or
a combined display, thus providing the ‘missing link between actors and concepts’
(Steensland 2008).
Discourse network analysis can be combined with the analysis of policy networks
(Adam and Kriesi 2007; Kenis and Schneider 1991; Lang and Leifeld 2008) by considering
discursive similarity or actor congruence as yet another network relation beside resource
exchange, contact making or influence attribution, and by assessing its impact on other
relations or policy outcomes. However, discourse network analysis expands beyond actors
and is in fact broader in scope. In the vein of Emirbayer and Goodwin (1994) and the
literature on discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008; Schmidt and Radaelli 2004), the
approach allows one to incorporate cultural elements into the explanation of historical
phenomena. At the theoretical level, it may therefore enrich other frameworks dealing
with the ideational structure of policy domains beside argumentative discourse analysis,
such as the Advocacy Coalition Framework (Sabatier and Weible 2007) with its emphasis
on coalitions centring around similar belief systems of actors, the study of Epistemic
Communities (Haas 1992; Roth and Bourgine 2005) and the involvement of technocratic
actors into policy making, or Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (Baumgartner and Jones
1991) and its focus on diverging policy images generated by groups of policy winners and
policy losers in a boundedly rational world. It would be beyond the scope of this paper
to relate discourse network analysis to each of these theoretical frameworks in detail.
In our specific case, the analysis of the conflict about software patents in Europe
demonstrates the existence of coalitions and offers an analysis of a key factor that explains
why one coalition was able to prevail over the other. Future research might be able to
pinpoint at the micro-level how decision makers in the European Parliament perceive
discursive structures and whether discourse always translates one-to-one into political
action by formal decision makers. At the meso-level, however, we are convinced that
discourse network analysis provides useful tools to qualify why and how discourse matters
in policy-making.
A Appendix
A.1 Frames used in the conflict
Accountability The EPO is not accountable for its policies.
Civilisation We need to preserve a civilisation where non-market areas and human
knowledge are respected.
Communism Those who are against software patents are modern communists.
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Competitiveness of big companies Software patents serve big companies.
Competitiveness of European economy The CII directive prevents disadvantage for
European companies in the global market.
Competitiveness of SMEs Software patents have a negative impact on the work of
small software developers.
Compliance with international treaties Software patents are against European law.
Consumer rights Software patents lead to less choice of consumers.
Costs Software patents raise costs for economic activities.
Creativity Patents on software impede creativity and innovation.
Crime A CII Directive that is too weak would make Europe a copycat paradise.
Democratic procedures It is questionable whether the decision-making process con-
cerning the CII Directive followed democratic procedure.
Economic growth/stability Patents are necessary to assure economic growth.
Efficiency, competence MEPs are misinformed about the directive.
European identity The directive contradicts the Lisbon strategy.
Freedom of speech/expression Software patents hamper freedom of speech and civil
rights.
Globalisation We need to implement the WTO treaty.
Harmonisation Patents on computer programmes are necessary as there is a need for
harmonisation within the EU.
Innovation and transfer of knowledge Too many patents impede innovation.
Legitimacy After the enlargement, the Council position does not represent the positions
of the new member states.
Marketisation Software patents lead to marketisation of knowledge and block the cre-
ation of knowledge.
Monopolies Big companies use patents to freeze innovation.
National economy Denmark will lose 800 jobs if CII directive is rejected.
(Neo-)liberalism Those who are against software patents are against free markets.
Open access/open source Software patents would endanger the development of open
source software.
Public interest The strengthening of the interests for intellectual property rights hold-
ers threatens the interests of the general public.
Relation with USA Europe should not follow the US software patents model.
19
Research and development Patents offer incentives to invest time and money in re-
search.
Rule of law Legal clarity must be reached.
Scope The scope of the directive should be restricted to trade.
Social and cultural development Software patents would endanger the free circula-
tion of knowledge.
Tolerance The lobbying campaign against the CII Directive was offending.
Unemployment A rejection of the CII Directive could cause job losses.
A.2 Actors present in the press
• 1&1 GmbH
• ADB (Advanced Digital Broadcast)
• AFUL (Association Francophone des Utilisateurs de Linux et des Logiciels Libres)
• AIPPI (Association Internationale pour la Protection de la Proprie´te´ Intellectuelle)
• Alcatel
• Arlene McCarthy (PSE)
• Attac
• Bernard Caillaud
• BITKOM (Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft, Telekommunikation und neue
Medien e.V.)
• Brian Crowley (UEN)
• Stiftung bridge
• BSA (Business Software Alliance)
• BVMW (Bundesverband mittelsta¨ndische Wirtschaft)
• C4C (Campaign for Creativity)
• Campact
• CCC (Chaos Computer Club)
• CDU (Christdemokratische Union)
• CEA-PME (Confe´de´ration Europe´enne des Associations de Petites et Moyennes
Entreprises)
• Chris Forsyth
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• Civil Platform PL
• ComArch
• Computer Law Association
• CP Tech (Consumer Project on Techology)
• Daniel Cohen
• Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Greens/EFA)
• Danny O’Brien
• DL (De´mocratie Libe´rale)
• Dominique Foray
• EICTA (European Information & Communications Technology Industry Associa-
tion)
• emcita
• EP (European Parliament)
• Ericsson
• ESR Pollmeier
• EuroLinux
• European Commission
• European Governments
• Eva Lichtenberger (Greens/EFA)
• F Gov (French Government)
• FFII (Federation for a Free Information Infrastructure)
• FI Gov (Finnish Government)
• Florence Autret
• Freiheit.com
• FSF (Free Software Foundation)
• G Gov (German Government)
• Gilles Savary (PSE)
• Grania Langdon-Down
• Greens/EFA
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• Hiltrud Breyer (Greens/EFA)
• IBM
• Intel
• International Law Association
• ISOC (Internet Society Poland)
• Jacques Mairesse
• James D. Zirin
• Jerzy Buzek (EPP-ED)
• Joachim Wuermeling (EPP-ED)
• Joris van der Hoeven
• Klaus-Heiner Lehne (EPP-ED)
• Lawrence Lessig
• Les Verts
• LiVe (Linux Verband)
• Lowells
• Magix
• Malcolm Harbour (EPP-ED)
• Marek Lazewski
• Maria Berger (PSE)
• Mercedes Echerer (Greens/EFA)
• Michael Kofler
• Michael Lang
• Michel Rocard (PSE)
• Microsoft
• Monica Frassoni (Greens/EFA)
• Munich
• Netzwerk Neue Medien
• Nicola Liebert
• Nokia
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• NoSoftwarePatents.com
• O’Reilly Media
• Opponents of software patents
• Othmar Karas (EPP-ED)
• P Gov (Portuguese Government)
• Paul Stevens
• PCF (Parti Communiste Franc¸ais)
• Pernille Frahm (GUE/NGL)
• Peter Jelf
• Philippe Simonnot
• Philips
• PL Gov (Polish Government)
• PS (Parti Socialiste)
• Ralph Nader
• Rebecca Harms (Greens/EFA)
• Reinier Bakels
• Richard Stallman
• Robert Bond
• SAP
• Siemens
• SPRO (Stowarzyszenie Polski Rynek Oprogramowania)
• stop-swpat.de
• The Foundry
• Toine Manders (ALDE)
• UK Gov (British Government)
• UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire)
• YDP (Young Digital Planet)
• ZVEI (Zentralverband Elektrotechnik- und Elektronikindustrie e.V.)
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